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Alternative Minimum Tax: The
Percentage Depletion Tax Preference
For Investments In Natural Resources
After Hill v. United States
INTRODUCTION
The Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) was enacted by Con-
gress in 1969 for both individuals and corporations.' The tax
was enacted because some of these taxpayers had effectively
avoided tax on a substantial portion of their economic income
through various extraordinary deductions. 2 The AMT was an
attempt by Congress to curtail this tax avoidance by applying a
smaller tax rate against a larger tax base (i.e. a base without
these special deductions). By enhancing the larger tax base, the
AMT would theoretically cause more taxpayers to pay income
tax.
Congress enacted the AMT after the Treasury Department
reported that some individuals with large incomes were paying
little or no tax.3 The report found that these individuals were
escaping tax liability by effectively using various income exclu-
sions allowed in the income tax scheme. 4 As a result, the middle
See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, § 301 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Although the minimum tax originally
enacted in 1969 was an add-on tax for both corporations and individuals instead of an
alternative tax, the distinction is not important for purposes of this note.
2 S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st. Sess., 1969-3 C. B. 423, 495 (some examples
include a percentage reduction of long term capital gains, accelerated depreciation
deductions, and depletion deductions greater than cost depletion).
I TAX RFroRM STrDIs AND PROPOSALS, U.S. TREAsuRY DEer., 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., Part 2, p. 132 (Comm. Print 1969) (concluding that a larger percentage of
taxpayers in the $50,000 to $100,000 income bracket pay an effective tax exceeding 30
percent compared to taxpayers with annual incomes greater than $500,000). See also
H.R. Rap. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1969-3 C.B. 200 (finding that there were 154
individuals in 1966 with adjusted gross incomes in excess of $200,000 who paid no
income tax). Although the Treasury focused on the tax disparity among individuals,
Congress found this inequality prevalent for both corporations and individuals when
enacting the AMT. See supra note I and accompanying text.
4 TAx REFoRm SrutlEs, U.S. TREAsuRY DEPT., at 132.
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and low income classes were bearing a significant portion of the
tax burden.' The Treasury Department believed this result was
contrary to a fundamental principle on which the income tax
system had been based-an individual's tax liability should be
equated with his economic ability to pay.6 Therefore, to help
remedy this problem, the Department proposed a minimum tax
system that would assure that all individuals, even those with
large incomes, would pay their share of income taxes.
7
The proposed minimum tax would be computed by applying
a minimum tax rate against an expanded income base including
both taxable income and exempt income. 8 The preference items
added back into income were items which the Treasury Depart-
ment believed contributed most to the tax disparity among in-
dividuals. Only four preferences were specifically mentioned in
the original proposal.9 One such preference was the exclusion
from taxable income of all income resulting from allowable
deductions for percentage depletion in excess of the capital in-
vested in property, for example, mineral operations.' 0 To develop
an understanding of why the Treasury Department believed the
percentage depletion preference item enabled certain individuals
to avoid their proportionate tax burden, an analysis of the
depletion allowance is presented below.
THE DEPLETION ALLOWANCE
Minerals such as oil, gas, metallic ores, valuable nonmetallic
rock and coal are wasting assets. As the minerals are produced
or sold, the mineral deposit from which they are taken is grad-
ually exhausted. Similar to the depreciation allowance for the
use of physical properties, depletion is an allowance which en-
ables an investor in natural resources to recover his capital outlay
in the mineral." Depletion and depreciation are also similar in
that the costs are generally recovered over the life of the prop-
' See TAx REosu STUts, U.S. TREASURY DEPT., at 132.
6 TAX REFOR STUDIES, U.S. TREASUtRY DEPT., at 132.
See TAX REroam STUDIEs, U.S. TREASURy DEPT., at 132-133.
TAX REFORM STUDIES, U.S. TREASURY DEPT., at 133.
9Id.
,0 Id. The other three preferences mentioned were; interest on state and local
government bonds, the exclusion from net long term capital gains, and the appreciation
of property contributed to charities.




erty-depreciation over the estimated useful life of the asset and
depletion over the life of the resource (i.e. until the resource is
exhausted).1 2 Although there is some similarity in the mechanics
and objectives of depreciation and depletion, 3 these recovery
methods are two entirely different schemes under the present
income tax system.
4
To determine the depletion allowance, the taxpayer computes
depletion under both the cost 5 and the percentage 16 methods,
and then claims the greater of the two amounts on his tax
return.' Basically, cost depletion allows taxpayers to recover a
portion of those costs which are allocable to mineral property
sold or otherwise used in producing the income for that year. 8
Under this method, once depletion has been claimed for the
year, the taxpayer reduces his adjusted basis in the mineral
property by the allowable depletion. 9 The cost depletion allow-
ance continues pro-rata until the mineral resource is completely
exhausted.20 Once a taxpayer's capitalized costs have been re-
couped, he can no longer recover cost depletion. 2'
Percentage depletion, on the other hand, is computed by
multiplying a statutory percentage by the annual gross income
from the property. 22 Since percentage depletion is based on
income, there is a possibility of recovering deductions during
the property's lifetime totalling more than the actual investment
in the property. 23 Thus, owners or lessees of interests in mineral
12 Elton Lasseigne, Oil and Gas Transactions, 110 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-I (1991).
(This is not true for the percentage depletion method.) See infra notes 22-23 and
accompanying text.
3 Depreciation and depletion contain similarities, however, cost depletion is ac-
tually more akin to cost of goods sold. Martin J. McMahon, Fundamentals of Federal
Income Taxation of Natural Resources, 3 J. MrN. L. &POL'Y 225, 233-234 (1987-1988)
(citing an analogy in U.S. v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 302 (1927)).
" Compare I.R.C. §§ 167-68 with I.R.C. §§ 611-14 (West 1986).
5 I.R.C. §§ 611-12 (West 1986).
16 I.R.C. § 613 (West 1986).
11 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(a)(l) (as amended in 1973). Compare I.R.C. § 613A (West
1986) (Investors in hard minerals are allowed to take percentage depletion; however,
only certain oil and gas producers are allowed to use this method.).
18 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1972).
9 I.R.C. § 612 (West 1986) (citing § 1011 for the purpose of computing adjusted
basis).
Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(b)(2) (as amended in 1972).
21 Javed A. Khokhar, Alternative Minimum Tax, 288-4th Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-73
(1989). (Note that the investor has already recovered his investment tax-free.)
Treas. Reg. § 1.613-1(a). The applicable percentages for various minerals are set
out in I.R.C. § 613(b) (West 1986).
" Khokhar, supra note 21.
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deposits are able to receive tax-free income through this deple-
tion method.24
Since depletion and depreciation are separate concepts under
the income tax scheme, taxpayers must properly allocate capi-
talized costs between the property's depletable basis and its
depreciable basis. 25 In the case of coal mines and other hard
mineral operations, any "[e]xpenditures for improvements [or]
replacements" on the mine are normally capitalized and recov-
ered through depreciation deductions.2 6 That is, they are allo-
cated to the property's depreciable basis rather than to the
property's adjusted depletable basis.
In the case of oil and natural gas wells, the drilling and
development costs incurred during the operation of the wells are
categorized as intangible or tangible CoStS. 21 Intangible costs
include "all expenditures made by an operator for wages, fuel,
repairs, hauling, supplies, etc., incident to and necessary for the
drilling of wells and the preparation of wells for the production
of oil or gas. "' Tangible costs include physical improvements
to the property for the operation of the wells such as the addition
of machinery, tools, equipment, pipes, and similar items.
29
For intangible costs, a taxpayer has the option either to
deduct in full (as expenses) the costs incurred in that year or to
capitalize them. 0 If the taxpayer capitalizes the costs, he then
recovers those costs either through depreciation or depletion,
depending on their nature.3 Intangible costs incurred through
installation of physical structures and equipment are recovered
through depreciation. 2 Intangible costs of clearing ground,
draining, road making, surveying, and drilling wells are recov-
erable through depletion.33
4 Id. (Owners/lessees are still allowed to recover a statutory percentage of gross
income from the mineral property even though the property's depletable basis has been
reduced to zero.).
" Martin J. McMahon, Fundamentals of Federal Income Taxation of Natural
Resources, 3 J. MiN. L. & POL'Y 225, 272 (1987-1988).
Treas. Reg. § 1.612-2(a) (1960). (However, if these expenditures meet certain
requirements under this section, they are expensed when paid.)
27 See Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a), (c) (1965).
Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965).
Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(c) (1965).
Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965).
3' See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (illustrating a similar allocation
of costs for mineral operations).
12 Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(b)(2) (1965) (including amounts paid for wages, fuel,
repairs, hauling, supplies, etc.).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(b)(1) (1965).
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The AMT preference item for percentage depletion proposed
by the Treasury Department was adopted by Congress as part
of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.14 The preference item was
defined as "the excess of the deduction for depletion allowable
under section 611 for the taxable year over the adjusted basis
of the property at the end of the taxable year (determined
without regard to the depletion deduction for the taxable year).""
By including this preference in the minimum tax calculation, the
federal government was attempting to prevent producers and
investors in mineral interests from reducing their income tax
liability through the percentage depletion allowance while main-
taining substantial economic income. This was part of an effort
to strengthen progressivity and assure that all economically prof-
itable taxpayers paid at least some income tax.
However, the recent court of appeals decision, Hill v. United
States,a6 contravenes this purpose by permitting mineral opera-
tors to continue enjoying a significant tax preference by effec-
tively claiming percentage depletion in computing their alternative
minimum taxable income. 37 In Hill, the husband and wife plain-
tiffs were in the oil and gas exploration business.3 On their 1981
and 1982 income tax returns, they included unrecovered tangible
costs (i.e. the remaining depreciable basis) of machinery and
equipment that had been installed on the mineral property in
the calculation of the property's adjusted basis in order to com-
pute the amount of depletion as a tax preference subject to the
minimum tax.3" The United States Claims Court initially ap-
proved this computation, 40 and its decision was affirmed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.4 ' A writ
of certiorari has recently been granted by the Supreme Court,
but no decision has been released as of this publication. 42
In deciding for the taxpayers, the court misapplied the stat-
utory and regulatory language concerning the tax preference
14 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, § 301 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
I.R.C. § 57(a)(8) (West 1986).
3 Hill v. United States, 945 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W.




• Hill v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 713 (1990).
4 Hill, 945 F.2d at 1529.
," Hill v. United States, 60 U.S.L.W. 3735 (U.S. April 27, 1992) (No. 91-1421).
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item. The court reached its determination after analyzing section
57(a)(8) of the 1982 Code .4 The regulations under this section
refer to section 1016 for computing the adjusted basis of the
property'4 and to section 614 for defining the property.45 Section
1016 requires an adjustment to basis for all "expenditures, re-
ceipts, losses, or other items properly chargeable to capital ac-
count.' 4 The regulations promulgated under this section of the
Code include the "cost of improvements or betterments made
to the property" as an item properly chargeable to capital.
47
They also specifically disallow any adjustment to basis for any
item expensed and deducted during the tax year.'4 Since those
costs of tangible improvements to the property in the Hill case
which had not been expensed (i.e. the depreciable basis) met the
above requirement, the court determined they should be included
in the property's adjusted basis for computation of the depletion
preference.
49
The court also concluded that section 614 did not aid in
defining a mineral property's adjusted basis, even though the
regulations under section 57(a)(8) refer to that section for pur-
poses of defining "property." 5 0 The court held that although
section 614 "speaks expansively about what interests in mineral
deposits can be aggregated into a single property, it says nothing
about what adjustments to the cost basis of that property are
appropriate when calculating the 'adjusted basis."' 5 ' Thus, the
court determined that section 1016 alone controlled the deter-
mination of what constituted a property's adjusted basis for
minimum tax purposes.
To support its analysis that the adjusted basis for minimum
tax purposes included unrecovered tangible costs, the court con-
cluded its decision was in line with the Internal Revenue Code
policy of providing tax incentives for investors in the oil and
I.R.C. § 57(a)(8) (1982) (the excess of the depletion deduction allowable over
the adjusted basis of the property at the end of the year disregarding the current year's
depletion deduction).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.57-1(h)(3) (1987).
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.57-1(h)(1) (1987).
I.R.C. § 1016(a)(1) (1986).
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-2(a) (1983).
a Id.
41 Hill, 945 F.2d at 1538.
- Id. at 1535.
11 Id. (emphasis in original).
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gas industry.52 The court believed that including unrecovered
costs for tangible improvements to the property in determining
the adjusted basis was consistent with the policy of encouraging
oil and gas development.53 Finally, the court reached its conclu-
sion without support from the legislative history of the AMT
tax preference item because it concluded that this history was
not helpful.5 4
ANALYSIS OF THE HLL DECISION
The court reached the wrong conclusion in Hill and the
following analysis will critically examine its decision." The spe-
cific language of the Treasury Regulations demonstrates that the
mineral property's adjusted basis should not include depreciable
basis for purposes of the depletion tax preference. In computing
the adjusted basis of the property for purposes of the depletion
preference, Treasury Regulation 1.57-1(h)(3) refers to section
1016 of the Internal Revenue Code. 6 The regulations under
section 57(a)(8) refer to section 614 for purposes of defining the
property on which the preference is calculated. 7 This section
defines property as "each separate interest owned by the tax-
payer in each mineral deposit . . , Thus, according to section
32 Id. at 1533.
53 Id.
11 Hill, 945 F.2d at 1535, n.10. (The court was correct in this assessment. Although
the depletion preference proposed by the Treasury Department required percentage
depletion in excess of depletable basis, the subsequent amendments and revisions by
Congress never specifically defined what constituted the property's adjusted basis.) See
TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, U.S. TREASURY DEPT. 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 139
(Comm. Print 1969). See generally H. R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1645,
reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 200, 249-50; S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st. Sess. 2027,
reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 497; Cows. REP. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st. Sess. 2392,
reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 644, 659. For a general analysis of the legislative history
surrounding the depletion preference, see Marvin K. Collie and William M. Linden, The
Tax Reform Act of 1969 and Domestic Oil and Gas Producers, 21 INST. ON On & GAS
L. & TAX'N 419, 432-37 (1970).
11 For other commentaries critical of the Hill decision, see Martin 3. McMahon,
Significant Current Developments in Oil and Gas Taxation, 42 INsT. ON OIL & GAS L.
& TAX'N §§ 15.10(2), 15-1, 15-51 (1991); John S. Dzienkowski and Robert J. Peroni, A
Critical Review of the Hill Decisions: Calculating Excess Depletion Under the Alternative
Minimum Tax, THE NAT. RESOURCES TAx REv. 243 (Sept.-Oct. 1991).
1 Treas. Reg. § 1.57-1(h)(3) (1987).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.57-1(h)(1) (1987).
- I.R.C. § 614(a) (1982).
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1016(a)(1), the "property" on which adjustments to basis should
be made is the "mineral deposit."
'59
A mineral deposit is defined as "minerals in place." 6 This
mineral deposit makes up part of the mineral enterprise. A
mineral enterprise, in contrast to a mineral deposit, is defined
as "the mineral deposit or deposits and improvements, if any,
used in mining or in the production of oil and gas, and only so
much of the surface of the land as is necessary for purposes of
mineral extraction.' '61
The distinction between a mineral enterprise and a mineral
deposit is important because only the mineral deposit is subject
to depletion. 62 In order to receive a depletion deduction, it is
necessary to maintain a separate capital account for the mineral
deposit. 63 As the dissent in Hill correctly noted, "the capital
account of the mineral deposit on which depletion is calculated
includes the cost of the deposit itself and certain exploration
costs . . . .It does not include the costs of improvements used
in production, such as machinery and pipes. The latter are
adjustments only to the enterprise." Thus, these unrecovered
tangible costs are not "properly chargeable to the capital ac-
count" of the mineral deposit as required by section 57(a)(8) for
purposes of computing the adjusted basis of the property.65 This
is the plain language of the statutes and the regulations, yet the
court in Hill misconstrued this language. The court did not
specifically define "property" in section 1016 as the mineral
deposit, but defined it as the mineral enterprise. Thus, it deter-
mined that the adjusted basis of the mineral property should
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.614-1(a)(1) (1977) (defining property for purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code as each separate interest owned in the mineral deposit). Cf. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.614-2(a) (1974) (as amended by § 226(b)(3) of the Revenue Act of 1964) which prior
to the enactment of Revenue Act of 1964 allowed a taxpayer to aggregate separate
operating mineral interests and treat them as one property, even if the interests were
from different tracts of land.
0 Treas. Reg. § 1611-1(d)(4) (1974).
61 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(d)(3) (1974).
Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(l) (1987).
6 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(b)(1) (1974).
, Hill, 945 F.2d at 1539 (dissenting opinion); see Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(b). But
even the dissent was in error by stating the adjustments should be made to the enterprise
because an enterprise cannot have a basis. See I.R.C. § 1060 (holding that the costs
should be allocated among all of the assets within the "enterprise."). See also Williams
v. McGowan, 58 F. Supp. 692 (W.D. N.Y. 1944) (holding the costs of a business should
be allocated among the individual assets).
61 I.R.C. § 1016(a)(1) (1986).
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include unrecovered depreciable costs. 6 But, as mentioned above,
the property on which the adjusted basis is computed is defined
by section 614 as the mineral deposit, not the mineral enter-
prise.
67
The court's interpretation of section 57(a)(8) also conflicts
with a previous Claims Court decision. In 1985, this court ad-
dressed whether a minimum tax on the percentage depletion
preference was unconstitutional in Mobley v United States.68 The
issue was whether the minimum tax on the above preference
constituted a tax on income or a direct tax on the recovery of
capital. 69 In determining that the minimum tax was constitu-
tional, the court construed section 57(a)(8) of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code. 70 The court interpreted this statutory section as
follows:
According to [the] clear language of the statute, the minimum
tax, as applied to percentage depletion, does not operate as a
direct tax on the return of capital. Rather, it operates to tax
income otherwise sheltered by plaintiffs' depletion deductions
which are in excess of their basis in the depletable property."
By allowing the Hill's to include unrecovered depreciable costs
in the adjusted basis of the mineral property, the court is allow-
ing a result inconsistent with the reasoning in Mobley. The
Mobley court properly recognized that the depletion preference
was an amount in excess of only the depletable property's basis.
72
By recognizing that the computation focused on depletable prop-
erty, the court eliminated the addition of unrecovered deprecia-
ble property to the adjusted basis. Although the Claims Court
correctly construed section 57(a)(8) in Mobley, the reasoning
used in that decision was not followed in Hill.
Not only did the Hill court misconstrue the express statutory
and regulatory provisions concerning the depletion preference,
but its decision also conflicts with basic tax fundamentals un-
derlying the concepts of depletion and depreciation. Depletion
and depreciation are two entirely separate concepts. The Su-
Hill, 945 F.2d at 1533.
' I.R.C. § 614(a) (1982).
0 Mobley, Jr. v. United States, 8 CI. Ct. 767 (1985).
0' Id. at 769.
,0 This is the same 1976 statute under analysis in the Hill case.
" Mobley, 8 Cl. Ct. at 771.
72 Id.
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preme Court recognized this distinction in Choate v. Commis-
sioner."3 In this case the Court properly recognized that
depreciation was an allowance for the exhaustion of an asset
used in a trade or business and that depletion was an allowance
for the exhaustion of natural resources. 74 More importantly, the
Court held that "only intangible drilling and development costs,
not costs represented by physical property, are returnable by
way of depletion.""5 Thus, this opinion requires that the tax-
payer correctly allocate capitalized costs when they are incurred
between the depletable natural resource property and non-de-
pletable assets.
Although the difference between depletion and depreciation
was not recognized by the Hill court, many other authorities
have understood the distinction. For example, the Tax Court
held in Clemente, Inc. v. Commissioner6 that a proper compu-
tation of the depletion allowance for a property should be de-
termined only after removing the nondepletable assets from the
basis. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) held in a revenue
ruling that the cost of acquiring a mineral enterprise should
properly be allocated between the property's depletable and de-
preciable bases.7 Also, tax commentators on natural resources
have agreed that "the [property's] depletable basis does not
include nondepletable, nondepreciable assets such as land, nor
does it include wasting assets such as equipment and improve-
ments that are subject to ... depreciation." These authorities
uniformly agree that depreciation and depletion are entirely sep-
arate concepts for purposes of regular and minimum tax; there-
fore, the Hill court contradicted logic and reason by allowing
unrecovered tangible costs to be included in the property's de-
pletable basis.7 9
71 Choate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 141 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1944),
rev'd 324 U.S. 1 (1945).
74 Choate, 324 U.S. at 2-3.
75 Choate, 324 U.S. at 3.
76 Clemente, Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 497 (1985).
" Rev. Rul. 69-539, 1969-2 C.B. 141.
7' DzisEKOWSc supra note 11, at 321. See also McMahon, supra note 13, at 272
(stating that only the part of a property's basis attributable to the mineral property may
be included in the depletable basis); Khokar, supra note 21, at p. A-32, A-76 (stating
that a depletion deduction is allowed only if the costs are not represented by physical
property and that if such costs are represented by physical property, then a depreciation
deduction may be claimed).
,' However, the IRS misapplied the same issue in Rev. Rul. 68-231, 1968-2 C.B.
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Finally, the result in Hill is inconsistent with the legislative
intent of enacting a minimum tax, especially as it relates to
producers and investors in natural resources. The minimum tax
scheme was enacted to reestablish progressivity among the eco-
nomic classes.8 0 More specifically, the percentage depletion pref-
erence was enacted to prevent investors and producers in natural
resources who use percentage depletion from realizing excessive
amounts of tax-free income. Yet, the court's decision permits
these taxpayers to continue realizing tax-free benefits even after
the property's depletable basis has been exhausted-a result com-
pletely inconsistent with the purpose of the minimum tax.8'
The court also tried to support its conclusion in Hill by
arguing that the outcome was consistent with congressional en-
couragement in oil and gas investment.82 However, that conclu-
sion seems extraneous in light of the actions taken by Congress.
By enacting the Tax Reform Act of 1969, not only did Congress
create a percentage depletion preference item for minimum tax
purposes, but it also reduced the percentage depletion rate from
27.501o to 22%.111 In fact, when the Senate had an opportunity
to leave the percentage depletion rate at 27.5%, it declined to
do so by a substantial margin.A4 Furthermore, incentives to oil
and gas producers were subsequently limited when Congress
enacted Internal Revenue Code section 613A in 1975. This sec-
tion prevented many producers from computing percentage de-
pletion in determining the annual depletion allowance."
264 (permitting a lessor of mineral property and equipment to depreciate equipment and
deduct percentage depletion on royalties attributable to the equipment).
H.R. RaP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1645, reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 200.
" A double benefit is allowed for minimum tax purposes for post-1986 tax years
due to the implementation of section 56(a)(1). This section requires depreciation to be
computed on tangible assets for alternative minimum tax purposes using longer recovery
periods than the depreciation computation for regular tax purposes. Not only does a
taxpayer reduce his percentage depletion tax preference amount by the property's current
year depreciable basis, he gets to subsequently reduce his minimum tax depreciation
adjustment in future years when his AMT depreciation exceeds his regular depreciation.
02 Hill, 945 F.2d at 1533.
" Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, 682 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Today, the percentage depletion rate is
15% for those oil and gas investors who can claim percentage depletion.
115 Cong. Rec. 38228-9 (1969).
, See infra note 87 and text. Although I.R.C. section 613A was enacted by a
different Congress than the one enacting section 57(a)(8), it substantially restricts the
Hill court's reasoning that section 613 allows oil and gas taxpayers an incentive by
recovering amounts far in excess of their expenditures because many of these taxpayers
were no longer allowed to use section 613 depletion after 1975. The Hill court failed to
mention this point.
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The congressional actions described above clearly demon-
strate that Congress was not as concerned with encouraging oil
and gas investment as it was with effectively curtailing investors
from reaping tax-free benefits. The Hill decision is inconsistent
with that policy.
IMPACT OF THE DECISION ON DEPLETION PREFERENCE TODAY
Even though the Hill decision construed the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code, which was amended with the enactment of the
1986 Tax Reform Act,8 6 this decision still has a significant impact
today on the percentage depletion tax preference item for the
mineral industry nationwide. When Congress enacted the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, the language in section 57(a)(8) was carried
over verbatim from the 1954 Code and codified in section
57(a)(1). 87 Since the language for the depletion preference is the
same, the regulations drafted by the Treasury Department for
section 57(a)(8) of the 1954 Code are relevant in interpreting
section 57(a)(1) of the 1986 Code. Because the Hill court con-
strued statutory language and regulations which continue to be
in force even today, its decision has continuing vitality for post-
1986 tax years.
Under current law, the greatest impact of Hill from a mon-
etary standpoint is on the hard minerals industry. This is because
many producers in the oil and gas industry are prohibited from
using percentage depletion. In the Tax Reduction Act of 1975,88
Congress curtailed the number of oil and gas producers who
could claim percentage depletion.8 9 Section 613A of the Code
eliminated the percentage depletion allowance for any oil and
gas properties owned by integrated oil producers, proven oil and
gas properties transferred after 1974, and foreign oil and gas
properties.9 Thus, percentage depletion was no longer available
', Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
LANCE ROOK, TAX PLANNING FOR AMT, § 8.02 (1991).
S Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
0 See generally I.R.C. § 613A.
'o DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 11, at 280-81. (In 1990, the Revenue Reconciliation
Act repealed the provision relating to the transfer of proven properties.)
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to large retailers and refiners, but only to the small independent
producers or royalty owners. 9I
Unlike oil and gas producers, large corporate producers en-
gaged in the exploration and production of hard minerals are
not subject to the 1000 barrel limitation in computing percentage
depletion. 92 Since the IRS has admitted that the Hill decision
applies to this industry, 93 these corporations arguably could re-
duce the depletion preference using the Hill analysis by including
unrecovered costs from their processing plants and production
equipment such as tipples, draglines and other depreciable assets
in the property's adjusted basis. This procedure could signifi-
cantly reduce the impact of the alternative minimum tax on such
producers. The IRS has already received $400 million of refund
claims,9 and "estimates that there are $5 billion of refund claims
with respect to open years." 95 More importantly, these numbers
do not consider future tax years.
As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court has granted a
writ of certiorari to the Federal Circuit to decide the tax pref-
erence issue. This article makes no prediction as to the Court's
ultimate decision. However, even if the Supreme Court affirms
the Federal Circuit's decision, the IRS still might attempt to
amend the regulations concerning the alternative minimum tax
implemented by the 1986 Tax Reform Act. The regulations for
section 57 of the Code have not been updated since passage of
the 1986 Act.9 Therefore, the IRS may issue new regulations
that better define a property's adjusted basis for purposes of the
depletion preference.
Congress has given the Treasury Department the authority
to issue regulations in section 7805 of the Code. This section
11 ELTON LASSEIONE, 110 T.M., Or AND GAS TRANSACTIONS A-43 (1991). (In 1981,
the Hills qualified for percentage depletion because they were independent producers.)
See I.R.C. § 613A(c)(3) (allowing independent producers or royalty owners to compute
percentage depletion only with reference to 1,000 barrels of average daily production).
See generally McMahon, supra note 13, 3 J. Min. L. & POL'y 225, 240-244.
I.R.C. § 613(a), (b).
" Percentage Depletion and Alternative Minimum Tax, LAW LErTR (Greenebaum
Doll & McDonald), Dec. 1991, at 6.
" Supreme Court to Decide Proper Computation of Alternative Minimum Tax
Preference, 2 RIA's Analysis of Federal Taxes: Income (RIA Tax Pub. Div.) No. 18,
at 500 (April 30, 1992).
Percentage Depletion and Alternative Minimum Tax, supra note 93, at 6.
Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 5302 (1992) (stating that old regulations may
not be good since P.L. 99-514 repealed old code (1991)).
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allows the Treasury to issue new regulations as necessary if there
is any alteration in the laws of the internal revenue. 97 Also, the
Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of a federal agency
drafting new regulations in the case of Rust v. Sullivan.98 In
Rust, the Supreme Court decided that the Secretary of Health
and Human Services had the authority to issue new regulations
to better define section 1008 of the Public Health Services Act.
The Court stated that the regulations were proper because the
statutory section and its legislative history were ambiguous and
because the Secretary amply supported the regulations with a
reasoned analysis. 99
Based on section 7805 and Rust, the IRS could validly issue
new regulations concerning the alternative minimum tax provi-
sions of the 1986 Code. The 1986 Act provided sweeping changes
to the alternative minimum tax. For example, the statutory
provisions enacted by Congress greatly extended the minimum
tax effect on C corporations by creating a system which requires
a completely separate accounting system in computing the tax,
including separate depreciation rules.tE In fact, the changes to
the tax preference items were so significant, that one writer
deemed the AMT regulations predating the 1986 Act as generally
irrelevant.' 0' Thus, the IRS could argue new regulations are
necessary in order to deal with the sweeping effects of the 1986
Act.
More specifically, the statutory section and its legislative
history are ambiguous as defined in Rust because they do not
speak directly to the specific issue; 10 2 namely what constitutes a
property's adjusted basis. After 1986, the Tax Reform Act im-
plemented a new depreciation system for purposes of the alter-
native minimum tax.'0 3 Therefore, tangible property subject to
depreciation now has two bases-regular tax and alternative
I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1986).
Rust v. Sullivan, __ U.S. __ , 1II S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
Id. at 1762.
m ROOK, supra note 86, § 1.01(1), at 1-3.
10 Id. at 1-3, n.4.
11 Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767.
o10 I.R.C. § 56(a)(1), (2). This section requires corporations to compute depreciation
on tangible assets for alternative minimum tax using longer recovery periods in addition
to the depreciation computation for regular tax purposes. Also, the corporations must




minimum tax. In light of this modification, the statute is am-
biguous because there is a "question as to whether the regular
tax or the AMT adjusted basis of tangible equipment should
control the determination of the preference amount."'' 4 Thus,
there is enough ambiguity in the minimum tax provisions of the
statute to warrant the issuance of new regulations.
Once the ambiguity of the statutory sections is proven, the
IRS's construction of the new regulations "must be accorded
substantial deference . . . and may not be disturbed as an abuse
of discretion if it reflects a plausible construction of the statute's
plain language and does not otherwise conflict with Congress'
expressed intent."'' 5 By drafting regulations which define a pro-
perty's adjusted basis as not including unrecovered tangible costs,
the IRS should be able to meet the Rust threshold. The definition
would qualify as a plausible construction if for no other reason
than to provide a symmetry between the regular tax and alter-
native minimum tax provisions. The construction should also
comply because the expressed intent by Congress in enacting the
alternative minimum tax under the 1986 Code was to ensure all
taxpayers (both individual and corporate) pay their fair share of
the income tax burden.'06 By constructing the new regulations to
not include unrecovered tangible costs, the IRS would further
that objective.
CONCLUSION
The alternative minimum tax was established to ensure that
individuals and corporations paid a fair share of income taxes.
More specifically, the depletion preference was enacted to help
prevent investors in natural resources who use percentage deple-
,1 Ruling allows AMT Refunds, 61 PETROLEUM INDEPENDENT 9, at 9 (quoting Mike
Hilger).
101 Rusi, I1I S. Ct. at 1762 (relying on Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44).
'' S. REP. No. 313, P.L. No. 99-514, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 518 (1986).
INJo taxpayer with substantial economic income [should be able to] avoid
significant tax liability by using exclusions, deductions, and credits. Al-
though these provisions may provide incentives for worthy goals, they
become counterproductive when taxpayers are allowed to use them to avoid
virtually all tax liability. The ability of high-income individuals ... to pay
little or no tax undermines respect for the entire tax system and thus, for
the incentive provisions themselves. In addition, aside from public percep-
tions, . .. it is inherently unfair for these taxpayers to pay little or no tax
due to their ability to utilize various tax preferences.
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tion from recovering tax-free income. In deciding Hill, not only
does the Federal Circuit conflict with the purpose of the alter-
native minimum tax, but it misinterprets the statutory language
of the Internal Revenue Code and fails to separate the depletion
and depreciation concepts. While these flaws currently have un-
dermined the purpose of the depletion tax preference, the Su-
preme Court may remedy the issue by reversing the decision of
the Federal Circuit. If the Supreme Court does not reverse the
prior decision, the Treasury Department may respond by issuing
new regulations. Section 7805 of the Code and Rust v. Sullivan
appear to give it that authority.
Wade C. Lawson
